Dear partner,
Let us start with the best wishes for the new year. Good health for you and your loved ones, business successes, and many stock market gains.
At the beginning of the new year, we like to take a moment to look back to where we started last year. The title of the newsletter back then was: ‘2023 will be a good year.’ Regardless of what happened, 2023 would be a good year. Either the stock market would rise, or we would have opportunities to further strengthen our portfolio with attractive bargains.
Contrary to expectations, it has become a bit of both. After an initial strong start, stocks dipped again, only to rise somewhat in the summer and then continue to decline, reaching a low point at the end of October, after which a year-end rally began.
Are Joël and I satisfied with 2023? Yes and no. Yes because we made some excellent purchases and increased positions in existing stocks at attractive prices. And no because the losses of 2022 have not yet been fully recovered with the rise in the stock markets.
Beating the Belgian stock market was once again not difficult, but compared to America or a global index, we are not performing as well. We also find it dreadful to have to explain why that is, because it feels like making excuses, a hindsight story to tell. And what does it matter, the results are what they are. But we still do it because it is also the explanation for why we have such strong faith in the future of our fund and the companies in our portfolio.
If you look at portfolios with very good results, you will invariably find companies from the so-called Magnificent 7. To illustrate the dominance of these stocks, here are some figures.
Magnificent 7 are the stock market
The Magnificent 7 have a market capitalization that is four times larger than that of the companies in the Russell 2000, the small-cap index consisting of 2,000 companies, starting from $250 million, so not very small companies either.
The market capitalization of Microsoft alone is as large as that of the entire Canadian stock market. Together, these seven companies are as large as all the stocks on the stock exchanges of the United Kingdom, Japan, and Canada combined. These are truly not small markets, where world players like Toyota, Sony, Unilever, Shell, Rio Tinto, and GlaxoSmithKline among others also list their stocks.
The combined profit of the Magnificent 7 over the past twelve reported months amounted to $320.3 billion. When I look at the 10 largest companies in the United Kingdom, Japan, and Canada, I come up with a combined profit of $285.3 billion for these 30 companies. In other words, only a difference of 11%. Considering that there are 1,900 companies listed in London, 1,500 in Canada, and 3,900 in Japan, there’s little more to add to that.
That these seven companies are very fine, we agree with that as well. However, the price at which they are listed is a different story. In fact, these seven have become “the market.” If we were to remove these seven companies from the S&P500, the performance would not be noteworthy; these seven have been responsible for the outperformance.
For those interested, I have prepared a table with market capitalization, net profit, EV/EBITDA, price-earnings ratio, composite profit growth over the past 5 years, and the growth needed in the next 10 years to justify the stock price.
Without wanting to criticize these stocks – I repeat, they are good to great companies – the prices simply don’t make sense anymore. When you see that 4 out of the 7 companies couldn’t achieve the growth needed in the past 5 years to justify their prices for the next 10 years, you certainly should raise questions.
The growth these companies have shown in the past five, ten, or even twenty years is phenomenal. Companies that can sustain that level of growth for such a long time are very exceptional. But you know what’s even more exceptional? Companies that can maintain the same growth after such a growth period for another decade. And even if they can achieve that growth, your investment results are still going to be modest; they need to do better to deliver outperformance once again. In short, the odds are not in favor of investors in these companies.
In the past, we’ve experienced periods where a particular segment dominated the markets, such as oil companies and the Nifty-Fifty in the 1960s and 1970s. Be mindful, that those were also very good and even great companies, and many of those companies remain top-notch, like Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, McDonald’s, Gillette, and so on. But even then, valuations were driven so high that eventually a crash followed, and investors in these companies needed 12 years or longer to recover their losses in stock prices. I wonder how many of those investors held onto these stocks throughout that entire period.
We saw something similar happen during the Dot-com bubble. Investors in Microsoft also had to wait more than 16 years before they saw a new, higher stock price than in 1999, regardless of how strongly Microsoft performed.
Or what about the Japanese Nikkei index? It is still 11% below its peak in 1990. Market mania can be extraordinary.
Although we always say that we do not want to make predictions, I will now be arrogant enough to make one. I believe that we are on the eve of such a period for the Magnificent 7. What is expensive can become even more expensive, and I cannot put a timing on it, but this will not last forever.
Active vs. Passive
The exceptionally strong performance of these seven companies has resulted in the U.S. S&P500 index also building an excellent track record over the past 10-15 years. This has significant appeal to investors who want to passively track this index through inexpensive ETFs. ETFs that track global stocks, such as IWDA, also benefit from this.
This leads to a kind of chicken-and-egg story. Because the Magnificent 7 have a weight of 28% in the S&P500 and 18.6% in the IWDA, it means that for every 100 dollars invested in the S&P500, 28 dollars go to these 7 companies, and the remaining 72 go to the other 493 companies, further distributed by size. In the case of IWDA, for every 100 dollars, 18.6 go to the Magnificent 7, and the remaining 81.4 dollars are distributed across 1,600 stocks. In other words, the popularity of investing in ETFs only reinforces this trend, driving up prices and making these indexes more attractive, thus attracting even more capital.
On the other hand, we, with our actively managed fund specialize in smaller companies, at least, small by market standards. I stumbled upon the following image in colleague Robert Leitz’s quarterly report.
In this image, we see that index investing now accounts for 39% of all investments worldwide.
In the image above, we see that the money flowing into passive ETFs comes directly from actively managed funds.
In the United States, it’s even more pronounced, where according to Bank of America, 53% of assets are passively invested.
The capital flow into actively managed small-cap strategies has completely dried up. Experienced investors know that stock prices decline when there is little demand, especially when there is a lot of selling. Especially in less liquid stocks like small-caps, this can lead to significant declines if there is an imbalance between buyers and sellers.
Let it be clear, we are not against ETFs. On the contrary, for many, this is a better way of investing than selecting individual stocks themselves, especially if you have limited knowledge or time. However, what you should not expect is that the results of the past 10 to 15 years will seamlessly continue into the next 10 or 15 years. This was an exceptional period with low-interest rates and other developments that fueled these indexes.
As Joël and I have already indicated, this also presents opportunities when this money flow reverses. That’s why we’re also asking ourselves this question: Is there any reason to believe that this flow won’t reverse anymore?
Will small caps ever outperform again?
In an interview with Han Dieperink for Investment Officer, we read the strongest arguments against such a revival of small caps in general.
In the past, small caps achieved a higher return than larger companies, partly due to a premium on what was considered higher risk, along with the illiquidity of the stocks. This, combined with an information gap where active managers could make a difference. However, this information gap has disappeared; with the internet, all information is instantly available to everyone.
The same internet and online brokers should also improve the liquidity of these stocks. After a period of improvement, we saw that it deteriorated again, especially in recent years. In addition to capital flowing into ETFs, as discussed earlier, stricter regulations have also contributed to fewer brokerage houses following these smaller stocks.
Due to decreasing liquidity and attention for these small companies, it is also becoming increasingly difficult for them to raise money on the market when they need it for growth. Many companies are therefore questioning the added value of a stock market listing, especially considering the rising costs of listings. Not only for the listing itself but also because of all reporting obligations, including recently added ESG reporting.
The prestige of a stock market listing is also not what it used to be. Nowadays, a well-known private equity partner is often considered just as good or even better, because they are not dependent on market fluctuations when raising money.
Private equity, therefore, serves a need for companies, allowing them not to go public anymore. Private equity gets the best opportunities, which worsens the ratio of listed small caps compared to before. In the United States, the number of listed companies has decreased by 45% since the peak in 1997, with small caps experiencing a 60% decline. A similar trend can be seen in Europe.
If companies can grow faster with private equity partners than through the stock market, where the market imposes many additional obligations, it has a negative impact on listed small caps as a class as a whole. This means that only companies unable to secure financing from private equity or when private equity partners and founders want to benefit by selling their shares at inflated prices will go public. The remaining small caps may be larger companies that are no longer considered large for some reason, in other words, the less valuable. Companies undergoing a revival may be taken off the stock market by their owners or private equity before their market value has fully recovered.
Separating the wheat from the chaff is exactly what Joël and I are doing, but with a poor reputation for small caps as a whole, it will take longer for our good companies to attract market attention, and there is a greater risk that they will be taken off the stock market at too low prices.
The above argument supports investing in holdings to complement our portfolio. All of our holdings are also active in the private equity market.
Regardless of the reason, whether it’s the flow of money into passive funds or private equity making small caps less attractive, the result is clear. In the United States, despite the rise in the fourth quarter, small caps are still close to their lowest valuation in the past 20 years. I couldn’t immediately find data for Europe as a whole.
However, if we purely look at the numbers, we see that the S&P500 has a valuation of 23.2 times the price/earnings ratio, while the stocks in our portfolio (excluding cash and holdings) are trading at 10.8 times, with the expected growth not being significantly different. Which of the two would you want to own?
Reversion to the mean
One of the most powerful forces in the stock market is what they call ‘Reversion to the Mean,’ or the return to the average. It is a financial principle that states that the prices and returns of stocks will eventually return to their long-term average multiple or average growth rate. This means that the performance of a stock or a stock market index that is extremely good or bad in a certain period is likely to return to a more normal, average level.
For example, if the stock market experiences a period of very high returns, ‘reversion to the mean’ suggests that returns will eventually decrease to a more sustainable level. Conversely, if the market goes through a period of poor performance, this principle may indicate that improvement is likely on the way.
Specifically, in our case, this would mean that the prices of our stocks would rise, while the excessive valuations of the indexes, especially the S&P500 and IWDA, and particularly the Magnificent 7, would decline.
If you believe in this principle, which has been confirmed time and time again in the world of finance, it offers opportunities for rational and patient investors, which we consider ourselves to be.
On the subject of interest rates, we also see that this principle has held true. After an exceptionally long period of continuously declining interest rates (since the mid-1980s) and an equally exceptional period of near-zero interest rates, we are now witnessing an increase in interest rates. Although these interest rates may seem high to many, historically, they are still at the lower end of the average.
These higher interest rates should also have a positive effect on the relative valuation of our companies, which have a low level of debt compared to other publicly traded companies. However, we have not yet seen this reflected in stock prices.
Or in the words of Howard Marks, who emphasizes the cyclical nature of the market, the cyclical movements that lead to this ‘Reversion to the Mean’:
While there’s no fixed point that represents the official start or end of a cycle, most economic cycles can be described as follows. Notably, each step in the cycle causes the next.
- First, stimulative rate cuts bring on easy money and positive market developments;
- which reduce prospective returns;
- which leads to willingness to bear increased risk;
- which results in unwise decisions and, eventually, investment losses;
- which bring on a period of fear, stringency, tight money, and economic contraction;
- which leads to stimulative rate cuts, easy money, and positive market developments.
And also, the following quote from the well-known investor John Templeton applies to Chess Capital:
If you buy the same securities everyone else is buying, you will have the same results as everyone else.
Of course, we must acknowledge that this strategy did not yield the desired results last year
And the future?
In the media, you’ve probably read many future predictions or expectations for 2024. This year, Joël and I have even less of an idea of where things will go. Fortunately, for our investment approach, it’s not relevant at all.
What we plan to do is exactly the same as what we’ve been doing in recent years. This time, we rely on the principles of top investor François Rochon to explain this. We will continue to be humble, rational, and patient.
Humble: We realize that we cannot predict the macroeconomy. Examples like the wars in Ukraine and Israel, the COVID-19 pandemic, and attacks on ships in the Red Sea underscore this. We stay within our field of expertise and aim to continually improve ourselves. We acknowledge our mistakes, primarily to learn from them.
Rationality: We don’t get caught up in fads. We don’t care about what the next popular toy in the stock market is, and we don’t try to time it. Our focus is on what really matters, which is the financial results of companies and their future prospects.
If we don’t understand something well enough or can’t assess it, we simply stay away from it. We realize that we can’t predict the future, so we focus on our process. We are also willing to accept weaker years. Although 2023 wasn’t bad, it simply didn’t match the results of 2022.
We understand that this is part of investing. Investment styles come and go, and when our approach is not popular, others may perform better.
Patience: Our patience is currently being put to the test. The only way to deal with this is by maintaining our focus on our companies. That’s why we invite you to read these newsletters and participate in our (online) meetings. Ask us questions about our companies. We are also always available between our regular updates.
It’s important to note that patience is not the same as stubbornness. We continue to closely monitor our companies and are constantly looking for reasons why we should no longer hold a particular company. We must avoid, as the proverb says, being like a frog placed in boiling water. We must not get stuck in companies whose fundamental performance is deteriorating but that we don’t want to sell out of fear of loss.
The Fund
The fund’s return for 2024 amounted to 10.3% after costs. This result is not exactly what we had hoped for, but we have no control over when the market will appreciate our companies.
Our biggest frustration is that the partners who entered at the least favorable moment are still in the red. Although Joël and I are strongly convinced that this is only temporary, we find this a terrible feeling. We strive for performance, but unfortunately, we have no influence on the timing of valuation. When these partners entered, we didn’t know that it would be a less favorable moment; even some close family members entered at that time.
We cannot predict the stock market, and at that time, our portfolio was not expensive, which is why we did not discourage anyone from entering. On the other hand, we strongly felt at the end of last year that our portfolio was significantly undervalued, and that’s why we emphasized this and indicated that it was an opportune moment to enter.
In hindsight, the timing of this call turned out to be ideal, as it was also the market’s low point, followed by a year-end rally.
An analysis of our portfolio based on multiples
Last year, we began analyzing our portfolio based on financial ratios. We use the indicators that we consider important. Although we conduct a much deeper analysis for each individual stock, this approach provides you with an overview of our companies in a more understandable way.
For a complete explanation of our method, we refer you to last year’s annual letter. Here, we will briefly restate our goal.
We want to have an idea of how safe our portfolio is. The primary measure is simply looking at the debt ratio, often referred to by the English acronym D/E or Debt to Equity (debt compared to equity).
We want to know how much value our companies create. In that case, these ratios are important:
- Return on Invested Capital (RoIC)
- Company growth (we report on revenue growth and operating profit growth)
For our holdings, we measure the growth of book value adjusted for cash distributed to shareholders (through dividends and share buybacks) over a period of 10 years.
We want to know how cheap our companies are. To keep reporting clear, we work with well-known and easy-to-understand multiples.
- P/E: Price-to-Earnings ratio, which is market capitalization divided by net profit.
- EV/EBIT: Enterprise Value divided by Earnings Before Interest and Taxes.
- EV/EBITDA: Enterprise Value divided by Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization.
In our analyses, we rarely rely on multiples, but they do provide some insight and are familiar to business leaders because acquisitions are often negotiated based on these multiples.
For holdings, we compare market value to their NAV (Net Asset Value, i.e., the value of underlying assets). So, we use P/NAV.
Remember this diagram we introduced last year:
You can see our three baskets returning. We split the portfolio because the three segments have slightly different characteristics, and thus, some metrics are more relevant for one and less for the other.
The three segments are:
- The holdings: as of 31/12/2023, we have 7 holdings in the portfolio, accounting for a weight of 21.78%.
- The compounders: individual companies that, along with the holdings, are our core positions and which we hold for the long term. These companies create strong value by reinvesting their profits at a high return. The 5 compounders account for a weight of 30.38%.
- The value plays: individual quality companies that we were able to acquire very cheaply. These may not be the strongest in value creation, but we expect the market to recognize their true value and undergo a revaluation. The value plays account for a weight of 41.73%.
The rest of the portfolio is in cash, about 6.11%.
For each of these baskets, the emphasis is on being safe, quality, and not expensive. However, for one basket, value creation will weigh more (holdings and compounders), and for another, price will play a decisive role (value plays).
We indicate the emphasis with the green background color in the above diagram.
And now, the actual numbers!
We provide all figures as of the end of 2023 and include the calculation from last year (end of 2022) in parentheses.
Degree of safety
Our portfolio (the three baskets and our cash) has a 31% (2022: 30%) debt-to-total capital ratio. The debt-to-equity (D/E) ratio for our entire portfolio is 45% (2022: 43%). We are satisfied with that. It’s a very acceptable level of debt. We can say that our companies have a solid balance sheet. Here are the D/E ratios per segment:
- Holdings: 52% (2022: 60%)
- Compounders: 22% (2022: 36%)
- Value Plays: 75% (2022: 79%)
The fact that the total debt-to-equity ratio increased by 1% while each category improved is only due to the fact that we are holding less cash now (6.1% compared to 16.6% last year). The cash in our total portfolio acts as a buffer.
Degree of value creation
Our portfolio created value in 2023 through a good ‘Return on Invested Capital,’ averaging 13% (2022: 15%). By segment, it is as follows:
- Compounders: 18% RoIC (2022: 17%)
- Value Plays: 10% RoIC (2022: 13%)
This means that our companies generate an average of €13 in profit (after taxes) per €100 invested capital (2022: €15). It’s slightly lower than in 2022, but still good.
To create value, profitable growth is also necessary – we look at the average annual growth over the last 5 years:
- Compounders: revenue growth 10.0% (2022: 12.0%), profit growth 14.4% (2022: 14.8%)
- Value Plays: revenue growth 9.2% (2022: 9.7%), profit growth 11.0% (2022: 9.6%)
All figures are logically slightly better for our compounders compared to the value plays. We expect growth from the business for compounders and price gains from revaluation for value plays. These figures have no meaning for holdings.
For the holdings, we measure the growth of assets over a 10-year period. This averages 11.4% per year over the last 10 years (2022: 12.3%).
With all this data, we can conclude that the intrinsic value of the companies currently in our portfolio has grown significantly in recent years
Expensive or cheap?
Finally, we want to understand how the market value of our portfolio relates to the profit it generates. ‘P’ stands for market value (also known as market capitalization), and ‘EV’ stands for enterprise value. These are the values as of 31/12/2023. The profit figures are ‘E,’ net profit or earnings, ‘EBIT,’ operating profit, and ‘EBITDA,’ sometimes also referred to (a bit inaccurately) as operating cash flow (but it’s an acceptable proxy).
For the year 2023, we need to make a small adjustment. We don’t like allowing exceptions in calculations, but here we really have no other choice because the picture would be so distorted. For the P/E calculation (only this multiple), we leave out the Swedish real estate company Bonava. This requires some explanation.
We bought Bonava at a huge discount to book value, knowing that book value would decrease further. We believe that Bonava will survive the real estate crisis, and the market price at the time of purchase – and still today – was too low. In 2023, Bonava wrote down about 20% of its book value. Entire country divisions were sold, and exceptional costs were incurred because they had to let go of hundreds of employees. The result is an enormous exceptional loss. So much so that – although Bonava makes up only 1.15% of our portfolio – the P/E ratio of the total portfolio becomes meaningless.
So, excluding Bonava:
- Compounders P/E = 13.8 (2022: 9.4) EV/EBIT = 8.1 (2022: 7.7) EV/EBITDA = 5.9 (2022: 5.7)
- Value Plays P/E = 8.6 (2022: 8.8) EV/EBIT = 7.9 (2022: 6.3) EV/EBITDA = 6.2 (2022: 4.9)
Including Bonava, the P/E of the value plays would be 14.8 instead of 8.6, which is not a realistic picture at all.
We can conclude that both the compounders and the value plays are trading at slightly higher valuations than last year (the PF [Portfolio Factor] increased in value by 10%, and the profit figures of some companies were a bit disappointing). The label ‘cheap’ still applies when we take into account the other parameters of value creation and safety. Our companies have strong balance sheets, create value through growth and efficiency, and are valued at just 6 times EBITDA. This gives us comfort.
For the holdings, we compare the stock price with the net asset value (NAV) of the underlying companies. P/NAV = 0.855. This means that the holdings we currently have in our portfolio (pro rata their weight in our portfolio) are 11.5% below NAV value. To determine the NAV value of the holdings, we rely on the figures reported by the holdings themselves. When they are not available, we use book value. Again, this is not an exact science, but it gives us a feeling. In recent years, the premium on this group of holdings – calculated according to their current relative weights in our portfolio – has fluctuated between -10% and +5% (when we always take the stock price on 31/12).
This leads us to conclude that the current stock prices of the holdings are undervalued.
Results T-Klasse
Results A-Klasse
We have been saying for some time that we have no control over the rise of the fund itself because we cannot predict when the share price will evolve towards the intrinsic value. The increase in intrinsic value is what we strive for. Therefore, the recent decline in intrinsic value requires some additional explanation, but let’s first look at the overview from the beginning until now:
This year, the intrinsic value grew by only 1.9%. You can see the dip in the last month in the chart above. The reason for this is that we have taken an extra critical look at all the stocks. An additional critical examination.
For some stocks, the intrinsic value went up, but for some large positions (more information below in company news), we adjusted the intrinsic value downward. The reason for this across-the-board adjustment is revised future expectations. In our view, the attacks on ships in the Red Sea could potentially cause more damage to a fragile economy than is currently estimated.
In short, the increase in value is limited this year. We are likely too conservative with our value adjustment, but we certainly do not want to present it too optimistically. And it doesn’t matter much as long as the prices of our stocks remain so low. Even after the recent 12% increase over the last two months and these adjustments to the intrinsic value, the fund is still 54% more valuable than the price today.
Transactions
The ratio between purchases and sales alone can actually indicate what kind of year it has been, namely a year to build, not to cash in. We bought seven new positions and increased three existing positions.
We also sold three positions. As discussed earlier, Kernel was sold because the majority shareholder wanted to delist it from the stock exchange. He is somewhat abusing the situation to acquire these assets cheaply.
On the other hand, X-Fab was sold because we believed we had achieved most of the value here. It was time to take profits and invest the money elsewhere. For now, the price remains stable. For us, this is hopefully not a farewell but a see you later, and we can pick it up later at lower prices.
We sold Foot Locker for similar reasons. The outlook deteriorated, and the management’s plans to address the difficulties were presented in such a way that we wondered who they were trying to convince, us as shareholders or themselves. Therefore, we decided to exit with a small loss of 10.32% (including dividends) and invest our money in better opportunities.
Some numbers
Instead of providing the biggest winners and losers in terms of percentage, as we did in the past, it seemed better to switch to the largest positive and negative impact on the fund. This takes into account the size of the position in the portfolio. For example, Tessenderlo had a negative impact on the fund of 1.23%, while Nobia had an impact of 0.84%, even though the decline in Nobia was almost four times larger.
Below you will find the table with all closed positions of the fund since the start:
The expectation is that 1 in 3 stocks will close negatively, and for now, we are still above that. However, there have also been fewer sales due to the portfolio buildup. If the number of sales increases, this ratio will approximately match.
And finally, the five largest positions and cash:
Company news
We provide less information in this segment now and will go deeper into it in the quarterly letter that will be released in April when our companies’ annual financials are available. Instead of focusing only on core positions, Joel and I have decided to discuss the top 10 from now on.
However, the decrease in intrinsic value in December deserves an explanation. We have reclassified Kamux from a core position to a value investment. This is primarily a theoretical shift for us and indicates how we view the company. We are still convinced that it is significantly undervalued; otherwise, we would sell. In the past, we have sold other positions at a loss when we deemed it necessary.
This is not the case with Kamux. However, we find that the used car market is much more difficult to assess than we originally thought, due to the electrification of cars. Although we were aware of this from the beginning, one significant issue has arisen as we have gained a better understanding of the market and the sector. It is still not possible to thoroughly test the strength of a used car’s battery and the number of remaining charge cycles available. There are no standard tests and norms yet, making the purchase of electric cars risky. Since the battery is the most expensive part of the car, a defective battery can pose problems for the sellers of these cars.
This fact makes us more cautious. As a result, we have adjusted the intrinsic value downwards. However, Kamux still remains, in our view, a solid company that is profitable and growing in a very challenging market, and it still has significant growth potential. Therefore, we keep it in our portfolio. But we prioritize the principle of caution. As mentioned earlier, we do not want to be the frog slowly boiled alive.
At Cake Box, the adjustments to intrinsic value also stem from two aspects. Cake Box has sacrificed margins to support its franchisees during a challenging period. These franchisees can also read the annual reports and see how profitable Cake Box still is. In other words, it seems difficult to us to regain the margins, so we incorporate lower profitability into the intrinsic value, although it is still very strong.
The second aspect of the adjustment relates to the increasing risk of expansion into other countries. In our view, the company is not yet ready for that, and that’s why we apply an extra margin of caution.
Cake Box, too, remains a solid company trading at a very attractive price, and it continues to be a core position in our portfolio. We are simply taking extra precautions.
Next meeting
We have sent the invitation to all our partners, and registrations are coming in. Let us emphasize once again that it is a physical meeting in Vilvoorde. There is a “Google Meet” link included, but it cannot be used because we are not streaming the event.
The venue can comfortably accommodate about 40 seats. In the first instance, we would like to reserve these seats for you – our partners. Of course, we will try not to leave any seats empty, and potential future partners are also welcome. If you would like to bring someone along, please let us know.
As you know, we aim to hold our meetings at one of our partner’s or entrepreneur’s locations. This year, we are hosted by Transmoove, owned by Christophe Pierre. Christophe and his brother Didier have built the company together. Didier’s daughter, Flavie, will delight us with her culinary skills. We are delighted to welcome you to this family-oriented environment.
Location:
Transmoove
Radiatorenstraat 1
1800 Vilvoorde
So, not the Monnetlaan as mistakenly mentioned in the agenda invitation (that is the other branch of Transmoove).
The doors will open at 6:00 PM. We will begin with a welcome address at 6:30 PM, followed by the formal presentation and concluding with a light walking dinner.
Kind regards and thank you,
Sam & Joël